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Abstract 
Background: Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has affected the world in an unprecedented manner and South Asian 
countries were among the first to experience imported cases. Pakistan’s response to COVID-19 has been under scrutiny 
for its granularity, reach and impact.
Aims: to evaluate objectively the chronology and depth of the response to COVID-19 in Pakistan.
Methods: We evaluated available national and subnational epidemiological and burden information on COVID-19 cases 
and deaths in Pakistan, including projection models available to the Government at an early stage of the pandemic.
Results: Pakistan, with a population of 215 million and considerable geographic diversity, experienced case introduc-
tion from pilgrims returning from the Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by widespread community transmission. The 
National Command and Operations Centre, established through civilian and military partnership, was critical in fast 
tracking logistics, information gathering, real-time reporting and smart lockdowns, coupled with a massive cash support 
programme targeting the poorest sections of society. Cases peaked in June 2020 but the health system was able to cope 
with the excess workload. Since then, although testing rates remain low (> 300 000 cases confirmed to date), case fatality 
rates have stabilized, and with 6300 deaths, Pakistan seems to have flattened the COVID-19 curve.
Conclusion: Despite notable successes in controlling the pandemic, several weaknesses remain and there are risks of 
rebound as the economy and educational systems reopen. There is continued need for strong technical and programmatic 
oversight, linked to civic society engagement and working with religious scholars to ensure nonpharmacological inter-
vention compliance.
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Introduction
The world has witnessed an 18 month period like no 
other. From the early reports of a new disease caused 
by a possible coronavirus, subsequently confirmed to be 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-
CoV)-2, the outbreak became an epidemic with clear 
global risks. The resultant infection, called coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19), was declared a global pandemic 
on 11 March 2020 (1). Over the last 18 months, COVID-19 
has spread across the globe and led to > 196 million in-
fections and 4.2 million deaths (2). The disease continues 
to baffle epidemiologists and public health professionals 
across much of the developed world, with huge impacts 
on the economic, trade, commercial and public health 
outcomes. Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
are no exception, and many have also suffered outbreaks 
with huge loss of life and economic disruptions.
Early disease introduction and 
epidemiology in Pakistan 
Pakistan experienced early introduction of COVID-19 in 
February 2020. This was not surprising given its prox-
imity to China, where the outbreak originated, and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, one of the first major outbreak 
epicentres outside Europe. While the initial focus was on 
inbound travellers from China, this was rapidly readjust-
ed towards suspected cases among pilgrims returning by 
road from holy sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Un-
like structured airport entries, the Iranian border cross-
ing in the remote location of Taftan in Balochistan Prov-
ince meant that initial arrangements were inadequate 
and makeshift facilities for screening and quarantine 
had to be established. The disease quickly spread to all 
metropolitan centres and districts of Pakistan, although 
several rural districts of Balochistan and Southern Khy-
ber Pakhtunkhwa Province had comparatively lower re-
ported numbers of cases and negligible reported deaths. 
However, this was likely related to limited testing at pop-
ulation level (Figure 1). 
What guided national policy and early 
multisectoral responses? 
Health sector limitations in developing a comprehensive 
strategy for response became evident soon after identifi-
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cation of the first group of cases in Sindh among return-
ing pilgrims from holy sites in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran on 26 February 2020, as there were negligible public 
health laboratories with the capacity and standardized 
protocols for real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infections. These needed to be 
established including a mobile testing laboratory at re-
mote Taftan, alongside quarantine facilities. 
As the pandemic and its attendant challenges 
expanded into nonhealth domains, the initial response, 
mainly centred within the Federal Ministry of National 
Health Services, Regulation & Coordination (MoNHSRC), 
had to be completely redesigned. Formation of the 
National Coordinating Council (NCC) on 13 March 2020, 
headed by the Prime Minister with representatives 
from all key ministries including health, was a key early 
step, followed soon by the establishment of a National 
Command and Operations Center (NCOC) on 27 March 
2020. The NCOC was the implementation arm of the 
NCC for coordination across multiple provinces and 
jurisdictions, as well as between entities of the Federal 
Government (3). Other notable actions, despite limited 
resources, were the inclusion of the National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA) for emergency 
procurement and deployment of a wide range of 
resources by the Federal and Provincial Governments. 
There was little to guide the national response in the 
initial stages, beyond the broad early guidance of the World 
Health Organization and the response emerging from 
countries in the extreme grip of the pandemic (January 
to February 2020). These included China, which after 
an initial period of confusion and limited information, 
imposed a strict lockdown despite the Chinese New 
Year, to restrict movement of its population (4). With the 
rapidly changing initial responses from European and 
North American countries, the Pakistan Government 
imposed a series of early nonpharmacological 
interventions (NPIs), including closure of educational 
Figure 1 Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) morbidity and mortality distribution in Pakistan in March–September 2020
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institutions, bans on large gatherings like weddings, and 
closure of some nonessential businesses. Extension to a 
full lockdown in the largest city of Karachi followed on 23 
March 2020, and a day later in other major metropolitan 
areas. These were met by various challenges at different 
stages, given planned religious mass gatherings 
and traditional practices in the month of Ramadhan 
(Figure 2). Notwithstanding these considerations, strict 
implementation of movement restrictions and business 
closures played a major role in flattening the incidence 
curve, and preparing the health sector for the predictable 
surge of cases.  
Capacity and equipment for molecular diagnostics in 
public sector laboratories in Pakistan were limited. From 
the initial 4 laboratory testing sites in the public sector 
with a maximum daily capacity of 400 PCR tests, stemmed 
several testing sites across the country, established by the 
Federal Government under the supervision of Pakistan’s 
National Institute of Health (NIH) by the end of February. 
The Federal and Provincial Governments established 
expert committees to address COVID response, 
guidelines and regulations. The foci of these oversight 
groups were development of standard operating 
procedures for case detection (establishing testing 
systems and staff training), and guideline development 
for infection control in various settings as well as clinical 
care of patients with COVID-19. A small think tank was 
set up at the federal level for coordinating efforts and 
streamlining procurements, imports and distribution of 
testing kits and equipment, staff training and personal 
protective equipment (PPE). As Figure 3 indicates, 
notwithstanding considerable regional differences in 
rates of testing, overall numbers of confirmed cases per 
day climbed to a maximum of around 6000–7000 by 
mid-June and decreased to the current daily average of 
< 500. The number of COVID-19 related deaths, which 
is based on a standardized reporting system from > 500 
hospitals across the country, has decreased consistently 
and steadily. 
Local epidemiology and policy guidance
Lack of capacity and paucity of national and provincial 
public health institutions have affected the rapidity of 
obtaining relevant population-based information from 
research. The COVID-19 oversight committees estab-
lished at the federal and provincial level focused initially 
on logistics, and only began investing in data systems by 
the end of March 2020, reporting directly to the NCOC 
and publishing situational analyses on a daily basis on a 
public MoNHSRC COVID-19 information portal (5). This 
became a vital link for monitoring and trend analysis. 
A crucial element was enabling systematic inflow 
of testing data from a constantly increasing number of 
laboratories across the provinces and from public, private 
and nonprofit sectors. In a remarkable redeployment of 
resources, the existing reporting network and database 
for polio surveillance was used to fast track the process, 
and electronic interfaces were created to ensure rapid 
and accurate data flow. It was quickly recognized that 
there was little capacity within the existing health 
system infrastructure, even in large provincial capitals, 
to cope with the anticipated rise in critically ill patients. 
Hence, an essential objective of the initial rapid response 
strategy was to flatten the epidemiological disease 
curve to allow enough time to build systems’ capacity. 
While there were around 2000 intensive care beds in 
the country initially, few had the capacity to take care of 
COVID patients (Table 1). Several health facilities had to be 
revamped and equipped for functionality. The NCOC and 
NDMA played a crucial role in fast tracking procurement 
and local production of key commodities such as PPE and 
hand sanitizers. Local manufacturing of ventilators was 
initiated and by June 2020, Pakistan became largely self-
reliant on the COVID-19 supply chain and logistics. 
Data for decision making 
Establishing a central, accurate data repository was key 
to evidence-informed decision-making, which was facil-
Figure 3 Trends in confirmed cases and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) deaths in Pakistan 
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itated by the Digital Pakistan initiative with a data syn-
thesis system, and the launch of the Pak Nigehban App 
(6) to track and localize resources, especially the availa-
bility of intensive care unit (ICU) beds and ventilators.  
The Government used 3 different forecasting models 
for short- and medium-term decision making but these 
were not put in the public space. Alternative models, 
including those indicating dynamic disease projection 
profiles and duration, were produced by groups at the 
University of Toronto (7), Imperial College London (8) 
and the Institute of Health Metrics & Evaluation in 
Seattle (9), and were disparate in their predicted trends 
(Figure 4). The modelling exercise collectively guided 
the planning and decision-making at the federal and 
provincial level despite a gap in quality data collection 
systems; however, a learning curve was observed on both 
the demand and supply side of such information. It is 
unclear if any of these models drove policy as none were 
put up for public debate and scrutiny by the national 
scientific community. In fact, given limited testing and 
rudimentary data on response systems, many of these 
projections were met with scepticism or largely ignored 
in favour of real-time reporting of admissions and deaths. 
Given widespread scepticism at different stages as to the 
exact direction and severity of the pandemic in Pakistan, 
and widespread disagreements among various sections 
of society, especially the electronic and print media, 
medical professional bodies, mainstream political parties 
and religious scholars, it took time to develop a national 
consensus on approaches and solutions. In hindsight a 
national conference and consultative process with civic 
society could have avoided much acrimony and led to a 
common nonpartisan strategy (10).  
What went well? 
Notwithstanding the above and resource constraints, 
the Pakistan Government moved with alacrity once the 
scale of the disaster in other countries became apparent. 
Despite the limited role that the federal MoNHSRC has 
following the devolution of health services to the prov-
inces in 2011 (11), the multi-stakeholder response that 
it had was able to spearhead and support the national 
COVID-19 response. It played a key role in the NCOC 
which was chaired by the Federal Minister for Planning 
& Development. The NIH rose to the task of training 
technicians, procuring testing equipment and boosting 
capacities across Pakistan, and daily testing capacity 
was enhanced from < 2000 tests daily to a capacity of > 
50 000 across the public sector testing sites by August 
2020. The NCOC resolved the issues of logistics, supplies 
and procurements as a national emergency through the 
NDMA ranging from vital PPE, oxygen supply systems 
and establishment of COVID-19 care and treatment cen-
tres across the country. Pakistan faced a critical shortage 
of human resources with < 9500 trained professionals in 
critical care at the outset of the pandemic. Virtual train-
ing and skills development programmes for staff were 
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Academy and NIH partnership (12), which has trained > 
50 000 staff members to-date. 
A remarkable achievement was the establishment of a 
central reporting system for data at national and provincial 
levels with the ability to provide district-level estimates. 
This was real-time reporting and publicly available, in 
contrast with many other governments in South Asia. The 
establishment of a data flow system made both central 
and provincial level response planning possible. This was 
supported in due course by the innovative approach to 
contact tracing and identification of hotspots with local 
response; the so-called smart lockdowns (13). Deliberate 
efforts were also made to inform the public about the 
virus and to reinforce necessary precautions. All mobile 
phones in the country replayed short messages related 
to COVID-19 prevention strategies prior to connecting 
any phone call as a public service, and numerous social 
media campaigns were conducted at a variety of public 
and private levels. 
To spur private sector investments, the State Bank 
of Pakistan Refinance Facility for Combating COVID-19 
(SBP-RFCC) provided loans at < 3% interest to hospitals 
and medical centres. Funds were meant for COVID-
related expenses, from expanding/upgrading facilities to 
purchasing equipment such as ventilators or enhanced 
PPE. More than 6 billion Pakistani rupees (PKR) were 
disbursed to 35 hospitals, adding 13 brand new wards, 1112 
additional beds and > 350 ventilators. 
Pakistan also launched a robust response to the 
secondary effects of the sudden lockdown and loss of 
income for daily wage earners. A key intervention was 
the launch of cash disbursement through an existing 
social safety net Ehsaas (which means percipience). 
The programme targets female heads of households 
with disbursal of PKR 12 000 (US$ 75) allocated for 
each of the 12 million potential beneficiaries at risk of 
extreme financial hardship and food insecurity (14). The 
rapid institution of these response strategies as well as 
considerable private philanthropy and charitable support 
were some of the main reasons that Pakistan did not 
witness the tragic exodus of migrant workers and slum 
dwellers from the megacities seen elsewhere. 
Only time will tell the exact impact on education 
systems and learning across the large network of public 
sector schools that were forced to close by the end of 
March. While private schools and universities were able 
to initiate on-line teaching, the same was not possible 
for > 200 000 primary, middle and secondary schools in 
Pakistan, supporting some 25 million students (15). The 
Government launched a television channel (TeleSchool) 
dedicated to education on 13 April 2020. 
The role of the Prime Minister was notable. Early on, 
when restrictions and lockdowns were the mainstay of 
response, he spearheaded the Ehsaas programme for cash 
assistance, and thereafter took the decision, criticised 
by many as a financially risky, to reopen the economy 
and move to a strategy of contact tracing and smart 
lockdowns. This was brave and saved Pakistan from the 
tragic consequences of an abrupt and prolonged closure of 
the economy. The same decision, after much deliberation, 
to reopen schools and educational institutions by 15 
September 2020 is reflective of actions by NCOC and the 
political leadership on firm risk–benefit analysis.   
What did not work? 
Despite the achievements listed above, there were several 
levels of COVID-19 response in Pakistan that could have 
gone better (16). The numbers of tests achieved at pop-
ulation level remained a fraction of the desirable num-
bers, with considerable diversity across the country. The 
numbers tested in Islamabad Capital Territories were 
higher (124 888 tests per million population) than those 
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achieved in the provinces, especially Baluchistan (5955 
tests per million population) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(7271 tests per million population), and the latter numbers 
appear to have gone down further in recent weeks. As of 
30 July 2021, documented COVID-19 deaths in Pakistan 
are around 23 209 overall (~1 021 000 confirmed cases), 
these likely underestimate the true picture given the test-
ing level. However, it is unlikely that large-scale excess 
population mortality has been missed, given that burials 
are universal and with the limited numbers of burial sites 
across the country, any excess would have been evident. 
This was also queried in the larger cities with no evidence 
of excess deaths in comparable time periods. 
With some disagreements on the nature of response 
and strictness of the lockdown, mixed messages led to 
unnecessary acrimony and discord, and polarization of 
opinions between political parties. This compounded 
confusion at the level of civic society with large-scale 
breakdown of physical distancing by the end of Ramadhan 
(late May 2020), a judicial order to reopen businesses (18), 
and the predictable upsurge in cases across the board in 
June. 
Lack of consensus among religious scholars on the 
nature of restrictions and measures needed for Friday 
communal prayers forced some local governments to 
impose lockdowns covering Friday prayer times. Over 
time, this discord has settled and the most recent festival 
of Eid-ul-Adha and religious congregations during the 
month of Moharram did not see widespread flaunting 
of rules and crowding of public places. However, 
communication strategies and community buy-in for 
preventive measures such as use of face masks and 
physical distancing remain an issue, compounded by 
stigmatization of some households once identified by 
the smart-lockdown process. This risks engagement, 
reporting and hence tracking of hot spots or clusters. 
Premature celebration of the “victory” over COVID-19 and 
reduced compliance of mask use and physical distancing 
are major risk factors for resurgence of COVID-19, as 
was seen in the national Independence Day celebrations 
on 14 August or in some schools after reopening on 15 
September 2020. 
What lies ahead? 
Compared with many, including neighbouring coun-
tries, Pakistan appears to have “dodged the bullet” and 
blunted the feared effects of COVID-19. The overall cases 
and fatalities are significantly lower than in its eastern 
and western neighbours, although within the predicted 
range suggested by mitigation strategies in April 2020 
(7). Apart from the contribution of the Government’s re-
sponse detailed above, a range of factors have been cit-
ed. These include a young population (almost half are 
aged < 20 years); cultural practices that restrict social 
networking for families outside their immediate fami-
lies; and possible innate immunity with prior exposure 
to other coronaviruses (19). Two recent population-based 
serological surveys in Islamabad and Karachi suggested 
that between 14% and 28% of the population has antibod-
ies to SARS-CoV-2 (AI and ZAB, personal communication 
2020). However, given the unpredictability of the virus 
and the dreaded resurgence anticipated later this year, it 
is important to maintain strict compliance with preven-
tive strategies. As has been seen in other better-resourced 
countries, such as the United States of America and Aus-
tralia, periods of low circulation and disease burden can 
be followed by rapid upsurges and spread. The future 
in a COVID-19 era could depend on the objective analy-
sis of the past experience and identification of possible 
trigger points for imposition/withdrawing of NPIs while 
the new cases continue to rise and fall in a population. 
Pakistan utilized the polio surveillance programme to 
monitor and track COVID-19. This must be replaced by a 
robust surveillance and disease warning system.  
Pakistan has now reopened some of its schools, 
given the need to address the emerging learning gap 
(20). This re-entry of 53.4 million students and staff into 
group educational activities must be done in a careful, 
measured manner, with potential innovations to reduce 
exposure, such as shift systems for classes and almost 
universal use of face masks and hand hygiene. The 
interruption of primary healthcare services for women, 
children and elderly people has been massive. By most 
accounts, immunization rates among vulnerable children 
dropped precipitously as did most preventive services 
such as nutritional support programmes. These are 
being reinstituted rapidly and safely. Pakistan was able to 
relaunch its polio immunization campaign successfully 
in late July 2020 without any reports of health risks or 
COVID-19 exposure among vaccinators. The primary care 
programme with community-based lady health workers 
is beginning to restart its work in community education 
and identification of at-risk families, contributing to 
routine surveillance and nutritional support programmes 
(21). 
As in any emergency response, after the “adrenaline 
surge” comes a period of exhaustion and the COVID-19 
response has been no different. Frontline workers, 
managers and support staff have been working on an 
emergency footing for almost 18 months and by now 
predictable battle fatigue is setting in. Health workers 
have borne a disproportionate burden of exposure, 
infections and deaths in Pakistan but morale remains 
high. 
It is imperative, however, that all learn to live 
with the virus and its unpredictability. That means a 
gradual reopening of the economy and learning the 
“new normal”; the latter could be that the virus might 
continue to coexist for several years and have periodic 
upsurges. The vaccine pipeline for COVID-19 is busy 
and apart from effectiveness, many questions remain as 
to its eventual equitable distribution and availability in 
LMICs. Cash and Patel (22) rightly emphasize the need 
for contextual responses and strategies that are fit for 
resource-constrained LMICs. Pakistan is an example 
where the national public health response was based 
on a blend of global guidance but with pragmatic local 
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adaptation. While the Government may have taken 
risks in its response, the evidence to date suggests that 
it has worked, and with the right follow-up and care, the 
response could serve as an example for others to follow. 
For a country of 215 million people, to achieve the current 
stable status for an investment of under $0.5 billion (23), 
is a remarkable feat but not happenstance.  
Funding: Core support from the Institute for Global 
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التوازن بني العلم والسياسة العامة يف إطار االستجابة لكوفيد-19 يف باكستان 
ذو الفقار هبوتا، فيصل سلطان، عامر إكرام، عادل حيدر، أسعد حفيظ، حممد إسالم
اخلالصة 
اخللفية: رضبت جائحة فريوس كورونا 2019 )كوفيد-19( خمتلف أنحاء العامل عىل نحٍو غري مسبوق، وكانت بلدان جنوب آسيا من أوائل البلدان 
التي شهدت حاالت وافدة. وأجرينا دراسة تدقيقية الستجابة باكستان لكوفيد-19 للوقوف عىل تفاصيل تلك االستجابة ونطاقها وتأثريها.
األهداف: هدفت هذه الدراسة اىل إجراء تقييم موضوعي للتسلسل الزمني لالستجابة ملرض كوفيد-19 وعمق تلك االستجابة يف باكستان.
حاالت  بشأن  الوطني  ودون  الوطني  املستويْي  عىل  املتاحة  املرض  بعبء  املتعلقة  واملعلومات  الوبائية  للمعلومات  تقييًم  أجرينا  البحث:  ُطرق 
ع املتاحة للحكومة يف مرحلة مبكرة من اجلائحة. كوفيد-19 والوفيات النامجة عن املرض يف باكستان، ومن بينها نمذج التوقُّ
النتائج: شهدت باكستان، التي يبلغ عدد سكاهنا 215 مليون نسمة وتتمتع بتنوع جغرايف كبري، وفادة حاالت كوفيد-19 من احلجاج العائدين من 
مجهورية إيران اإلسالمية، وأعقب ذلك رساية جمتمعية واسعة النطاق. واضطلع املركز الوطني للقيادة والعمليات، الذي ُأنشئ من خالل رشاكة 
تنفيذ  جانب  إىل  الذكي،  اخلروج  وحظر  اآلين،  واإلبالغ  املعلومات،  ومجع  الرسيع،  ب  التعقُّ لوجستيات  يف  األمهية  بالغ  بدور  وعسكرية،  مدنية 
ن من  برنامج دعم نقدي واسع النطاق يستهدف أفقر رشائح املجتمع. وبلغت احلاالت ذروهتا يف يونيو /حزيران 2020، ولكن النظام الصحي متكَّ
دة حتى اآلن(، استقرت  مواجهة عبء العمل الزائد. ومنذ ذلك احلي، ورغم أن معدالت االختبار ال تزال منخفضة )أكثر من 300000 حالة مؤكَّ
حت منحنى كوفيد-19، إذ بلغ عدد حاالت الوفاة 6300 حالة. معدالت الوفيات بي احلاالت، ويبدو أن باكستان سطَّ
االستنتاجات: عىل الرغم من النجاحات امللحوظة يف مكافحة اجلائحة، ال تزال هناك عدة مواطن ضعف، وهناك خماطر بحدوث ارتداد مع إعادة 
ة حاجة مستمرة إىل مراقبة تقنية وبرجمية قوية، مع ربط ذلك بمشاركة املجتمع املدين، والعمل مع علمء الدين  ُظم التعليمية. وَثمَّ فتح االقتصاد والنُّ
لضمن االمتثال للتدخل غري الدوائي.
Trouver le bon équilibre entre science et politique publique dans la riposte à la 
COVID-19 au Pakistan 
Résumé 
Contexte : La maladie à coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) a touché le monde d'une manière sans précédent et les pays 
d'Asie du Sud ont été parmi les premiers à connaître des cas importés. La riposte à la COVID-19 au Pakistan a été 
examinée de près en raison de sa granularité, de sa portée et de son impact.
Objectifs : La présente étude vise à évaluer d’une manière objective la chronologie et la profondeur de la riposte à la 
COVID-19 au Pakistan.
Méthodes : Nous avons évalué les informations épidémiologiques et relatives à la charge de morbidité disponibles 
aux niveaux national et infranational sur les cas et les décès liés à la COVID-19 au Pakistan, y compris les modèles de 
projection disponibles pour le gouvernement à un stade précoce de la pandémie.
Résultats : Avec une population de 215 millions d'habitants et une diversité géographique considérable, le Pakistan 
a connu une introduction de cas à partir de pèlerins revenant de la République islamique d'Iran, suivie d'une large 
transmission communautaire. Le National Command and Operations Centre, établi par un partenariat civil et militaire, 
a joué un rôle crucial dans le suivi logistique rapide, la collecte des informations, l'établissement de rapports en 
temps réel ainsi que la mise en place des confinements efficaces, avec un programme de soutien financier ciblant 
les endroits les plus pauvres de la société. Le nombre de cas a atteint un niveau record en juin 2020, mais le système 
de santé a pu faire face à la surcharge de travail. Depuis lors, bien que les taux de dépistage restent faibles (plus de 
300 000 cas confirmés à ce jour), le taux de létalité  s’est stabilisé et, avec 6300 décès, le Pakistan semble avoir connu 
un aplatissement de la courbe des cas de COVID-19.
Conclusion :  Malgré les progrès notables réalisés dans la lutte contre la pandémie, plusieurs faiblesses demeurent et 
il existe des risques de rebond avec la réouverture de l'économie et des systèmes éducatifs. Il est toujours nécessaire 
d'assurer une supervision technique et programmatique solide, liée à l'engagement de la société civile et à la 
collaboration avec les personnalités religieuses pour garantir le respect des interventions non pharmacologiques.
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